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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 19Abstract
This paper analyses empirically the role of bank lending in monetary policy transmission
on the basis of Greek bank level data. Two approaches have been taken. One employing a
reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional variables to bank loans
in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein’s work. The other, which in general yields more
satisfactory results, brings together some of the features of the Bernanke-Blinder model
with a method for assessing the impact of differential balance-sheet characteristics on
banks’ ability to supply loans and investigates directly the behaviour of bank loan supply.
A loan supply function was estimated with the use of the bank data, and bank-specific
characteristics were found to systematically shift this function.
differential bank characteristics
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JEL classification: C23, E44, E51, E52, G21In contrast to the traditional money view, according to which monetary policy is
transmitted through changes in bank liabilities, the credit view emphasises an additional
transmission channel, the bank lending channel, which allows central bank actions to
affect the supply of credit from banks and, in turn, real spending in the economy.
Empirical studies, using mainly US data, have found that bank characteristics, such as
asset size, liquidity (or balance sheet strength) and capitalisation, are important in
assessing the impact of monetary policy on loan growth and in determining its
distributional effects.
This paper examines the role played by Greek banks in the transmission of monetary
policy and assesses the importance of cross-sectional differences in bank characteristics
for the operation of the bank lending channel, using monthly panel data that cover the
second half of the 1990s.
Two approaches have been taken for analysing the role of banks in monetary transmission.
One employing a reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional
variables, as well as their interaction, to bank loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein’s
work. Two indicators of cross-sectional differences were used: a size indicator,
differentiating large from small banks, and an indicator of the health of bank balance
sheets. The results, while compatible with the existence of a bank lending channel, were in
general not satisfactory. In an alternative approach, it was argued that bank heterogeneity,
though useful in accounting for loan supply shifts, is not the only element on which to
base the analysis of the effectiveness of the lending channel. By bringing together some of
the features of the Bernanke - Blinder model with a methodology for assessing the impact
of differential balance sheet characteristics on banks’ ability to supply loans, we
investigated directly the behaviour of bank loan supply.
The empirical results of this second approach show that monetary policy clearly has a
significant impact on the supply of bank loans and, through shifts in supply, on aggregate
economic activity in Greece. Bank data helped us identify a loan supply function, a task
that presents well-known difficulties for researchers. The response of loan supply to the
spread between the loan rate and the bond rate is one of the critical parameters in the
Bernanke - Blinder model that relates to the degree of substitutability between loans and
securities (for banks) and thus to the significance of the lending channel. In addition,
bank-specific characteristics were found to systematically shift the loan supply function.
The results showed that large banks can, to a certain extent, shield their loan portfolio
from monetary policy changes. Similar results hold for the more liquid (healthy) banks.
Non-technical summary
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Considerable research has recently examined the role played by banks in the transmission
of monetary policy. In contrast to the traditional money view, according to which
monetary policy is transmitted through changes in bank liabilities, the credit view
emphasises an additional transmission channel, the bank lending channel, which allows
central bank actions to affect the supply of credit from banks and, in turn, real spending in
the economy. However, difficulties in distinguishing shifts in loan supply from shifts in
loan demand have complicated the task of uncovering a lending channel at the aggregate
level. Thus, the evidence from studies using aggregate data was supplemented by an
analysis of the distributional effects of monetary policy changes. The question that
empirical studies have sought to answer is whether there are important cross-sectional
differences in the way that banks with varying characteristics respond to policy shocks
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Bank characteristics that were found to be important in assessing
the impact of monetary policy on loan growth and in determining its distributional effects
were asset size, liquidity (or balance sheet strength) and capitalisation.
This paper examines the implications of differential bank characteristics for the loan
supply behaviour of Greek banks, using monthly panel data that cover the second half of
the 1990s, and assesses the importance of these cross-sectional differences for the
operation of the bank lending channel. It is argued that bank heterogeneity, while useful in
accounting for loan supply shifts, is not the only, and indeed not the most important
element on which the search for an aggregate bank lending channel could be based.
The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 contains a discussion of the time series
evidence on the existence of the lending channel, followed by a brief survey of studies
using disaggregated bank data and their usefulness in identifying loan supply shifts.
Section 3 presents an overview of recent developments in the Greek banking system and
its characteristics that may be pertinent to the operation of the lending channel. Section 4
uses two approaches for analysing the role of banks in monetary transmission. One
employing a reduced form equation linking monetary policy and distributional variables to
bank loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein’s work. The other, which in general yields
more satisfactory results, brings together some of the features of the Bernanke-Blinder
model with a method for assessing the impact of differential balance-sheet characteristics
on banks’ ability to supply loans and investigates directly the behaviour of bank loan
supply. This section also discusses data issues and presents estimation results by applying
panel cointegration methods, which indicate the importance of the lending channel for the
Greek economy and of bank specific characteristics in accounting for a differentiated
response of loans to monetary policy changes. Finally, Section 5 summarises the main
conclusions.
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The bank lending channel is a separate channel that reinforces the operation of the money
channel for monetary policy transmission. Its existence is predicated on capital market
imperfections arising inter alia from asymmetric information. To the extent that the bank
lending channel operates, monetary policy can influence aggregate demand not only
through interest rates as in the traditional money channel, but also through its impact on
the supply of bank loans. When monetary policy tightens, bank deposits fall and the loan
supply schedule shifts upwards, which enhances the interest rate-induced effect on
aggregate demand. This effect on loan supply should be clearly distinguished from loan
demand contraction and the inward shift of the loan demand schedule associated with the
fall in output that higher interest rates entail.
The bank lending channel has been theoretically analysed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988)
in a model that expands the conventional IS-LM framework by taking into account the
bank loan market. Loans and bonds are assumed to be imperfect substitutes both for
borrowers and banks. This implies that, along with the bond rate, the bank lending rate is
also introduced in the analysis, as it influences loan demand and supply and the demand
for output. A key result of the Bernanke - Blinder model is that there is no bank lending
channel when (i) loan supply is perfectly elastic with respect to the loan rate, i.e. loans and
bonds are perfect substitutes in bank portfolios, or (ii) loan demand is perfectly elastic
with respect to the loan rate, or output demand does not respond to changes in the loan
rate, both cases implying that borrowers view loan and bond financing as perfect
substitutes. Note that when these conditions are satisfied, the demand for and the supply of
loans cannot be defined separately from the corresponding demand for and supply of
bonds.
The implications of the Bernanke - Blinder model are not easy to test empirically, and thus
obtaining “sharp measurements of the (channel’s) potency is a challenging task”
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, p.42). A number of studies over the last decade have
indirectly tested for the existence of the bank lending channel by examining timing
relationships either between quantity variables (output, loans, money and other bank or
firm balance sheet items) or between price variables (interest rates or interest rate
differentials). Following the first route, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have applied VAR
analysis to US data to examine the impulse response functions of bank loans, securities
and deposits to a positive innovation in the Federal funds rate. Their results showed (i) an
immediate decline in the volume of securities and deposits and a delayed decline in the
volume of bank loans, and (ii) over a somewhat longer time span , a rebuilding of bank
securities holdings and a further decline in loans, essentially matching the decline in
deposits. These results were felt to be consistent with a credit channel, but also with a
money channel, since loans responded with the same lag as unemployment to the
monetary policy shock.
In an attempt to separate the effect of loan demand from loan supply, Kashyap, Stein and
Wilcox (KSW, 1993) examined movements in the mix between bank loans and a close
substitute (i.e. commercial paper) for bank finance to firms, following changes in
monetary policy. According to the authors, the bank lending channel makes the following
prediction: a tightening of monetary policy would cause the supply of bank loans to
decline by more than the supply of commercial paper, whereas the composition of firms’
external finance would not be affected if monetary policy operated solely through the
money channel.  KSW found evidence that tight monetary policy leads to an increase in
commercial paper issuance while bank loans slowly decline. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995,
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of the operation of the bank lending channel. They instead proposed an alternative
explanation: monetary tightening does not only reduce the demand for all types of external
finance but it also redirects all types of credit from small firms to large firms, which rely
more heavily on commercial paper financing. In this case, commercial paper issuance may
rise relative to bank loans even when the supply of bank loans remains unchanged. Thus,
heterogeneity in loan demand rather than shifts in loan supply would explain a change in
the mix between bank and non-bank financing. Using data for the US manufacturing
sector, Oliner and Rudebusch found almost no evidence that a monetary shock changes
the composition of bank and non-bank debt for either small or large firms, which is not
consistent with the existence of a bank lending channel. In response to this criticism,
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1996) reported that even among large firms there appears to
be substitution away from bank loans to commercial paper after a monetary policy
contraction. Their statistical results, however, are not very robust; when the federal funds
rate is used as the monetary policy indicator, they do not support the existence of the bank
lending channel as is also the case with Oliner and Rudebusch’s paper. A common
limitation of all studies dealing with the issue of the existence of a bank lending channel
through the estimation of timing relationships is that they concentrate on relatively short-
term responses, which may not be very informative in view of the fact that banks are
prevented from adjusting their loans stock quickly after a monetary policy change, due to
loan commitments and other contractual agreements (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, p.
919), and that the observed responses may admit alternative interpretations, not
necessarily restricted to supply of credit shifts.
The difficulties in distinguishing shifts in loan demand from shifts in loan supply have
prompted researchers to focus on panel data to explore some of the cross-sectional
implications of the lending view, namely that the responses of banks and firms to changes
in monetary policy may differ, depending on their characteristics. In particular as regards
banks, the existing evidence indicates that, due to agency and/or search costs, they may
experience increasing costs of non-deposit external finance, which are higher for small
banks. Thus, small banks are expected to be affected more from a monetary contraction.
Kashyap and Stein (1995) using US data, tested the hypothesis that, after a monetary
contraction, the lending volume of small banks declines more rapidly than that of large
banks (i.e. d
2Lit/dMit dsizeit <0). Their empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis,
as the estimated coefficient on the monetary policy variable, which gives an indication
about the operation of the lending channel, declines with size. However, the coefficient for
large banks was positive and insignificant, indicating that for this group of banks the
lending channel may not be important. Large banks were defined as those representing the
top 1% of all banks and their assets accounted for 55% of the total system assets. As
estimation results are not presented for another part of the sample (the 99th percentile of
bank distribution) accounting for approximately 8% of the system’s assets, there is
potentially a total of 63% of the system’s assets, controlled by banks for which a lending
channel for monetary policy transmission may not exist. This in turn would cast doubt on
the importance of the lending channel for aggregate economic activity.
1
One problem with the above test is that banks with a large buffer stock of liquid assets can
partly, if not completely, insulate their loans from the effects of monetary policy. For a
bank of a given size, a tightening of monetary policy would cause loans to decline less, the
more liquid is the bank (i.e. d
3Lit
 /dMit dsizeit dBit >0). In this case, the bank would have a
                                                          
1 Studies using total loans for the aggregate banking system have generally shown an insignificant effect of
monetary policy on loan growth (see, e.g. Becketti and Morris, 1992, and Friedman and Kuttner, 1993).
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portfolio. Kashyap and Stein (2000) reported that small banks are on average more liquid
than large banks and this mitigates the effectiveness of the bank lending channel for these
banks. Indeed, by separating banks by asset size and liquidity, Kashyap and Stein found
that small banks with the least liquid balance sheet were the most responsive to policy.
Kishan and Opiela’s (2000) paper extended the above analysis to include, along with the
asset size, an additional differentiating characteristic – a bank’s degree of capitalization.
The role of bank capital is twofold. It is an indicator of bank health and, therefore, an
indicator of a bank’s ability to raise funds from alternative sources during contractionary
policy. Moreover, prudential supervision, and in particular capital adequacy requirements,
may affect the composition of bank asset portfolios, in the sense that well capitalized
banks are less constrained during periods of tight monetary policy, since these banks can
isolate, to some extent, their loan portfolio from monetary shocks. Kishan and Opiela,
using a model of a representative bank, came to the conclusion that the effect of capital on
the response of loans to monetary policy changes is positive. Thus, the better capitalized a
bank is, the less responsive its loans will be to changes in policy (i.e. d
2Lit/dMit dKit >0).
Their empirical results provide strong evidence that the smallest and least capitalized
banks are the most responsive to monetary policy, a finding consistent with loan supply
shifts for this category of banks. However, for larger banks, accounting for about 80% of
the system’s assets, loan responses to monetary policy changes are not statistical
significant, suggesting that a bank lending channel may not hold in total.
The tests of the lending channel discussed above that are based on bank characteristics
were limited to US data. Favero, Giavazzi and Flabbi (1999) empirically investigated the
existence of a lending channel for Europe also using disaggregated bank data. They tested
the same hypotheses as Kashyap and Stein (2000) for four European countries (France,
Germany, Italy and Spain), with cross-section data for 1992 and bank reserves as the
monetary policy variable.  Overall, they found no evidence of a lending channel in these
countries. For certain size groups, however, their results were counter-intuitive. For
example, they found that small banks in Germany, Italy and France use their excess
liquidity to expand loans in the presence of monetary policy tightening, contrary to the
prediction of the bank lending hypothesis.
A potential problem with studies examining cross section differences in the response to
monetary policy is that estimates may be affected by endogeneity bias. For instance, the
balance sheet strength variable may be endogenous in that banks which lend to cyclically
sensitive customers may hold a larger buffer stock of liquid assets to protect themselves
from the greater risk they assume. Other banks which are more conservative may hold a
larger stock of liquid assets as a result of a reduction in loans to cyclically sensitive
customers. Kashyap and Stein (2000) suggested a two step procedure to remove this bias.
The bottom line of the above review is that heterogeneity bears on the importance of the
bank lending channel as differential balance sheet characteristics are tied to banks ability
to supply loans (Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Nevertheless, it does not constitute the only
element on which the search for a bank lending channel can be based.
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Banks in Greece have historically played a dominant role in channelling financial savings
from surplus to deficit economic units, whereas the relative importance of other financial
institutions, such as mutual funds and insurance companies, in financial intermediation
was until recently very limited, but is currently increasing. The special role of banks in
financial intermediation was further enhanced by the following features of the financial
system. First, banks were highly regulated, and detailed selective rules and restrictions
governed the distribution of bank credit to economic sectors until the mid- 1980s.
Moreover, until December 1990, commercial banks were required to invest 40% of their
drachma deposits in government securities, mainly 3-month Treasury bills. This
investment requirement was phased out at the margin by end-1993 and banks converted
their accumulated Treasury bill holdings into negotiable medium-term government bonds.
However, the relatively thin market for government securities did not allow banks to sell a
large part of their portfolio of these securities without incurring substantial capital losses.
Second, the scope for financing through the capital market was also very limited, as the
Stock Exchange was not very developed until the beginning of the 1990s. Third, various
restrictions had been imposed on external transactions and in particular on capital flows.
Important developments in financial markets abroad, and the need to transpose the
relevant EU Directives into domestic law and modernise the Greek financial system led to
the gradual liberalisation of financial markets and external transactions, a process that was
essentially completed by the mid-1990s. As a result, bank intermediation has relatively
declined, whereas the stock market and mutual funds have displayed very rapid growth.
Banks have tried to counter this trend through financial innovations. Examples of this are
the development of synthetic swaps
2 and the increase in banks’ off-balance sheet items,
3
which mainly reflect the fast growth of financial derivatives. To a considerable extent,
financial innovations were driven by tax avoidance motives, as well as by the desire of
banks to circumvent reserve requirements, given the relatively high reserve requirement
ratio (12%, as against the 2% currently applied by the Eurosytem) and the significantly
low rates, compared with market rates, at which reserves were remunerated. The response
of the Bank of Greece to these developments was to broaden the reserve base, by
including all types of bank liabilities to residents and non-residents, arising from deposits
or credits or, in general, associated with asset management agreements. This system of
reserve requirements remained in place until June 2000, when it was harmonised with that
of the Eurosystem, with transitory arrangements for the release of the accumulated
reserves in excess of the new requirement. It should be also noted that a special regime
applied to the bulk of deposits in foreign currencies, for which the reserve requirement
ratio was effectively 100%. Again, a gradual harmonisation brought the reserve
requirement ratio for these deposits down to that applied by the Eurosystem.
The above discussion suggests that, prior to the recent harmonisation of the reserve
requirement system, banks operating in Greece had only very limited possibilities to
isolate their fund raising activities from the effects of monetary policy shocks and thus to
maintain their loan supply unchanged. The only possibility open to them was to resort to
the stock market for raising share capital, but this procedure could not be used flexibly,
given the institutional procedures that have to be followed for increasing share capital. On
                                                          
2 Synthetic swaps were developed in the early 1990s mainly for tax avoidance reasons. A synthetic swap
involved the transfer of an amount of funds to a term deposit account denominated in a foreign currency with a
bank abroad and the simultaneous forward selling of the principal and the interest for drachmas. The
difference between the spot and the forward exchange rates is treated as capital gains by tax authorities and is
not taxed.
3 Greek commercial banks’ off-balance sheet items as a percentage of total assets: 1993: 53%, 2000: 154%.
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until the mid-1990s, but it has increased considerably after financial liberalisation was
completed. Thus, the bank lending channel is expected to have been especially potent in
the period before the liberalisation of the banking system, but to have weakened
thereafter. Indeed, the available time series evidence based on the relationship between
output, money and credit for the period 1972-1996 indicates that a strong lending channel
existed in the earlier part of that period but its importance subsequently diminished with
the financial liberalisation (Brissimis and Kastrissianakis, 1997).
Kashyap and Stein (1997), on the basis of four indicators of the relative importance of the
bank lending channel in the EU countries (EU-12), classified Greece as a country where
the bank lending channel is more likely to work. The first indicator refers to the
concentration of the banking system: the more concentrated the system, the less sensitive
is expected to be its responsiveness to monetary policy shocks, given that large banks can
more easily substitute other liabilities that are not subject to reserve requirements and/or
are uninsured, for deposits. The second indicator is the rate of return on bank assets: other
things being equal, the more capitalised a bank, the higher its expected profitability, since
the cost its funds is relatively lower.
4 On the other hand, well capitalised banks should
have an easier access to capital markets to raise funds in the event of a deposit shock,
implying that monetary policy would have less of an impact on those banks. The third
indicator relates to the size of firms: smaller firms are more dependent on bank financing
than larger firms, as monitoring costs for small firms are so high that they would have
difficulties in securing non-bank financing. Thus, for a given contraction of bank credit,
these firms will be affected more. Finally, the fourth indicator refers to the importance of
non-bank financing, in particular equity and bond financing. Where the availability of
non-bank financing is greater, the efficacy of the bank lending channel is likely to be less.
Table 1 provides information on the structure of the Greek banking system according to
various characteristics at the end of 1998. Commercial banks constitute the most
important segment of the Greek banking sector, their share in total bank assets being
88.2%, while the share of specialised credit institutions is a little above 10%. Cooperative
banks hold a very low percentage (0.3%) of total bank assets, although their number has
been increasing in recent years.
The degree of concentration of the Greek banking system is relatively high, given that the
share of the three larger banks in total bank assets is almost 50%, while that of the banks
at the bottom 50 per cent of the distribution of their total assets is only 3.8%. However,
Greek banks are rather small according to an absolute size criterion as only 5 fall into the
“large bank” category, i.e. total assets larger than Є 6 billion, while there are 14 banks,
each with total assets not exceeding Є 50 million, which make up almost all of the bottom
quartile. As shown in Table 1, loans to the non-MFI private sector as a percentage of total
assets is higher in the case of small banks according to both absolute and relative size
criteria. On the contrary, holdings of securities represent a smaller percentage of the total
assets in smaller banks rather than in larger banks, indicating that the latter are relatively
more liquid. Furthermore, the share of deposits in total liabilities is higher in the case of
larger banks, but smaller banks are better capitalised.
As regards capitalisation, poorly capitalised banks rely on deposits more than well
capitalised banks. However, the ratio of loans to the non-MFI private sector to total assets
of well capitalised banks is higher, indicating that capital adequacy considerations may
                                                          
4 For a given level of total assets, the more capitalised a bank is, the lower will be the amount and cost of
borrowed funds, making the return on assets (ROA) higher.
have been more binding for poorly capitalised banks.
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The role of banks in the transmission process and the importance of differential bank
characteristics as regards the response of bank loans to a monetary tightening can be
empirically investigated by using the following specification based on Kashyap and Stein
(1995):
    ∆Lit = ∑ jaj∆Li,t-j + ∑ jbj∆rt-j + ∑ jcjZi,t-1∆rt-j + dZi,t-1 + ∑ jej∆Wt-j + vi + εit    (1)
where Li,t are real loans (in logs), rt is a monetary policy interest rate, Zit is a bank specific
characteristic, Wt is a vector of control variables, vi represents individual bank effects, and
ε it is the error term. Subscripts i and t refer to specific banks and time period, respectively.
Equation (1) is the typical reduced form equation of a bank that is compatible with the
existence of a bank lending channel and in which differential bank characteristics play an
important role in shifting the banks’ loan supply function. The parameters of interest in
this equation are the bj’s and cj’s, which are assumed to be the same across banks. A
monetary tightening is expected to reduce lending, hence ∑ jbj should be negative. Large
and liquid banks are expected to be able to better shield their loans from monetary shocks
by using their buffer of liquid assets and/or by attracting funds from non-deposit sources.
Thus, ∑  jcj is expected to be positive. Individual bank characteristics other than those
represented by Zi are captured by the fixed effect term vi.
Panel data on balance sheet items for Greek banks have been used to estimate equation
(1). The sample includes monthly observations covering the period January 1995 to
December 1999 for 12 commercial banks representing all sizes. Although the sample
contains only 20% of all banks operating in Greece, at end-1999 the share of these banks
in total assets, loans, and deposits of the banking system was 57%, 59%, and 68%,
respectively. Bank data had to be adjusted for two mergers that occurred in the later part
of 1999. Merged banks were assumed to remain independent and the relevant data after
the merger were allocated to each of the banks according to the pattern observed
immediately prior to their merging.
5 All balance sheet variables were deflated by the
consumer price index, seasonally adjusted and expressed in logs. The 3-month money
market rate (Athibor) is used as the monetary policy variable. As a control variable we
used an index of real GDP constructed on the basis of annual national accounts data and
available monthly indicators of economic activity for the main sectors of the economy.
6
The effects of bank specific characteristics are examined by using a balance sheet strength
(liquidity) and a size variable. Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets LQi,t (cash,
deposits held with other banks and securities) to total assets Ai,t. Bank size is measured by
total assets. The bank characteristic variables are defined as deviations from the cross-
sectional mean at each time period in the case of the size variable, so as to remove its
trend, or the overall mean in the case of the bank strength variable, which does not have a
trend:
                                                          
5 This treatment of mergers was adopted as a backward aggregation of merging banks would have resulted in a
considerable loss of information, while the bias introduced by allocating data to the particular banks after their
merging is small since, as mentioned above, the two mergers occurred only in the second half of the last year
of the sample period.
6 See Brissimis et al (2001).
ECB • Working Paper No 104 • December 2001 12           Bi,t = LQi,t /Ai,t – ∑t [(∑iLQi,t /Ai,t )/N]/T                                                       (2)
           Si,t = lnAi,t – (∑i lnAi,t)/N,                                                                               (3)
The system of equations (1) was estimated by using SUR weighted least squares
(sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator) which is appropriate when residuals are
both cross section heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated.
7 Furthermore, in
order to reduce possible multicolliniarity problems, we discarded the inflation rate and the
interaction terms with inflation which were much less significant. We ended up retaining
three lags for the other variables. Also, we included the 12th lag of the rate of growth of
loans in order to capture any seasonality that had not been removed. Finally, a dummy
variable was included to account for the impact of the turbulence in the foreign exchange
market in November 1997 that followed the financial crisis in Russia.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2. The direct impact of monetary policy on
loans has the correct sign but is not significant in either equation. The effect of the
interaction of the monetary policy variable with each bank characteristic also has the
correct sign and is significant only in the case of the liquidity variable, indicating that
more liquid banks can better shield their loan portfolio from monetary policy changes.
Empirical work based on equation (1) above appears in our view to have two limitations:
first, it relies on a reduced form relating loans to a monetary policy variable, which does
not allow the identification of the parameters of the structural model-the Bernanke and
Blinder model- that are relevant to the existence of the lending channel. Moreover,
measurement biases may be introduced from the use of explanatory variables, such as
GDP, data on which have only a time dimension. Second, variables are expressed in first
difference form, not taking into account possible equilibrium relationships.
An alternative approach would consist in trying to estimate directly the banks’ loan supply
function. The discussion in Section 2 above has shown that the identification of this
function is critical to the empirical investigation of the bank lending channel and panel
data can be useful in uncovering certain aspects of bank behaviour which may be related
to its existence.
Assuming that the loan market is competitive, we can specify the following equilibrium
loan supply function for the individual bank i:
               Lit =  α + β (ρt – it ) +  γ Dit                                   β>0,      γ>0                                  (4)
where Lit and Dit are real loans and deposits (in logs) of bank i in period t, and ρt and it are
the lending rate and the bond rate in period t.
                                                          
7 This is the analogue to the Seemingly Unrelated Regression- GLS using estimated cross-section residual
covariance matrix, with the appropriate across equation restrictions.
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Blinder’s model discussed above. In this specification, loans depend on the interest rate
spread, assuming that there is rate of return homogeneity of degree zero which implies
that, when all interest rates rise by the same amount, banks do not change the composition
of their portfolios. Furthermore, the lending rate variable only has a time dimension, since
in a competitive market the individual bank takes the price (interest rate) as given.
8 The
sensitivity of loan supply to the interest rate spread (i.e. the parameter β) is one of the
three parameters in the Bernanke and Blinder’s model which determine the lending
channel’s potency. When β →  ∞, loans and bonds are perfect substitutes for banks (ρ = i)
and there is no bank lending channel.  Deposits are the scale variable in (4).
The effect of bank characteristics can be introduced via the coefficient on (ρt – it) or Dit.
Assuming that bank characteristics affect loan supply by differentiating the loan response
to changes in deposits, we can assume that:
                γi  = γ0 + γ1Zit                                                                                                                                               (5)
where Zit is a bank specific characteristic, for example its balance sheet strength. In terms
of the Bernanke - Blinder’s model, this is translated into shifts of the loan supply function
and, consequently, of the CC curve according to cross-sectional differences.
9 Substituting
equation (5) into equation (4) we obtain:
                 Lit =  α + β (ρt – it ) +  γ0Dit  + γ1DitZit                                                          (6)
As in the previous model, distributional effects will be explored by using the same balance
sheet and size variables. The effect of asset size on the sensitivity of loan supply to policy-
induced shifts in deposits is expected to be negative (γ1<0): larger banks may find it easier
to raise non-deposit finance and thus partly offset the effects of contractionary policy on
loans. This makes the shift parameter γi smaller, implying a weakened lending channel.
Similarly, banks which hold higher ratios of liquid to total assets can better insulate their
loan portfolio against monetary shocks. This means that the response of loans to monetary
policy would be smaller for these banks and, as a result, the lending channel would be less
important.  As noted in Section 3, for a bank of a given size, the tightening of monetary
policy would cause loans to decline less, the more liquid is the bank. To capture this
effect, the interaction term ZitBit will be introduced in equation (5) with an expected
positive coefficient.
Equation (6) can be considered as a loan supply function incorporating the effects of
differential bank characteristics and will be the basis for the empirical analysis. To deal
with the issue of non-stationarity of the variables involved and the possible existence of a
cointegrating relationship between them we estimated a linear single equation error
correction model.
10
                                                          
8 This implies that for the estimation of the loan supply function of the individual bank the simultaneity
problem arising from the interaction of loan demand and loan supply, and the identification problem do not
exist. Of course, to the extent that the bank loan market is imperfectly competitive the results will suffer from
estimation biases. However, the perfect competition assumption is commonly made in all studies of the bank
lending channel.
9 Had we introduced the effect of differentiated bank characteristics through the coefficient on the interest rate
spread, this would have affected both the slope and the position of the CC curve.
10 Alternatively, the non-linear least squares (NLS) single equation estimation method for the simple ECM
specification, suggested by Phillips and Loretan (1991), could be used, which gives asymptotically efficient
and median unbiased estimates of long-run equilibrium relationships. For an application of this method, see
Chinn (1997) and Chinn and Johnston (1997).
ECB • Working Paper No 104 • December 2001 14           ∆Li,t = φi,0 – φ1ECTi,t-1 + φ3∆Li,t-1 + Γ∆X i,t-1 + ui,t             φ1 >0                     (7)
where φi,0 is a bank specific constant capturing the effect of bank specific variables not
included in the cointegrating relationship, ECT is the residual of the cointegrating
equation and X is the vector of the right hand side variables in equation (6). In order to
have a parsimonious representation of the error correction model, the lag length was
restricted to one,
11 which was sufficient to ensure that residuals were not autocorrelated.
We estimated the cointegrating relationship without bank specific effects in the constant
term and with homogeneity imposed across the slope coefficients. The cointegrating
vector defines residuals that are stationary. To test for stationarity, the differenced residual
is regressed on the lagged residual and bank dummies:
           ∆ECTi,t = δECTi,t-1 + bank dummies + ui,t                           δ>0                      (8)
The t-statistic on the δ coefficient is then compared to the critical value given in Table 5 of
Levin and Lin (1992). If the t-statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity and hence of no cointegration can be rejected.
The estimated cointegrating relationships with distributional effects are shown in Table 3.
As with the previous model, SUR weighted least squares were used in all estimations. The
t statistic for testing for cointegration is given at the bottom of this Table. It indicates that
the null hypothesis of no-cointegration can be rejected in all cases. As already mentioned,
bank characteristics included in the regressions are the bank size (Sit) and the balance
sheet strength (Bit). The interaction terms of these variables with deposits (Dit) give an
indication of the importance of distributional effects in shifting the loan supply function.
Interaction terms always have the expected sign and in most of the cases are significant.
Equation 1 in Table 3 shows that large banks are able to partly insulate their loan portfolio
from a monetary policy tightening. Similar results are found for the more liquid banks
(Table 3, equation 2). Furthermore, the equations which use both the size and balance
sheet strength variables confirm the hypothesis that the sensitivity of lending volume to
monetary policy is greater for smaller banks with weaker balance sheets.
In all estimated equations, the coefficient of the spread variable is positive and significant
(at the 5 percent level
12), providing evidence of imperfect substitutability between loans
and securities in bank portfolios.
13 Thus, the panel data allow the identification of the loan
supply function, which is critical to the operation of the lending channel. Finally, the
estimated coefficient of reversion (φ1) is statistically significant and implies that the half-
life of a deviation from equilibrium is about two years. This is a plausible result given that
during the sample period about 40 percent of total bank loans to the private sector were
long-term with an estimated average maturity of about 8 years.
A second issue on which we focus is the possible bias due to the endogeneity of the
deposits variable. To correct for such bias, we used an instrumental variable estimator for
deposits. The instruments used were lagged values of loans and deposits and the
contemporaneous and lagged values of the interest rate spread and GDP. Correcting for
endogeneity bias does not essentially alter the basic conclusions derived from the above
estimation, although the importance of the bank lending channel appears to have
                                                          
11 With the exception of the dependant variable for which the lag length was three. Also the 12th lag was
added to capture any seasonality that had not been removed.
12 At the 10 percent level in equation 4.
13 This would imply the existence of a bank lending channel, provided that there is also imperfect
substitutability between loans and bonds on the part of borrowers.
ECB • Working Paper No 104 • December 2001  15strengthened somewhat, as judged by the size of the estimated coefficient of the spread
and the significance of shift factors represented by bank differential characteristics.
14
5.  Conclusions
The use of bank level data has recently supplemented the empirical analysis of the role of
bank lending in monetary transmission with aggregate data. Moving away from the
aggregate data, a number of studies have addressed the issue that monetary policy actions
may affect banks’ loan supply function, by testing the cross-sectional implications of the
lending view.
In this paper two approaches have been taken. One employing a reduced form equation
linking monetary policy and distributional variables, as well as their interaction, to bank
loans in the spirit of Kashyap and Stein’s work. This equation was estimated by using
panel data for Greek banks covering the second half of the 1990s and two indicators of
cross-sectional differences: a size indicator, differentiating large from small banks, and an
indicator of the health of bank balance sheets. The results, while compatible with the
existence of a bank lending channel, were in general not satisfactory. In an alternative
approach, it was argued that bank heterogeneity, though useful in interpreting loan supply
shifts, is not the only element on which to base the analysis of the effectiveness of the
lending channel. By bringing together some of the features of the Bernanke - Blinder
model with a methodology for assessing the impact of differential balance sheet
characteristics on banks’ ability to supply loans, we investigated directly the behaviour of
bank loan supply.
The empirical results of this second approach show that monetary policy clearly has a
significant impact on the supply of bank loans and, through shifts in supply, on aggregate
economic activity in Greece. Bank data helped us identify a loan supply function, a task
that presents well-known difficulties for researchers. The response of loan supply to the
interest rate spread is one of the critical parameters in the Bernanke-Blinder model that
relates to the degree of substitutability between loans and securities (for banks) and thus to
the significance of the lending channel. In addition, bank-specific characteristics were
found to systematically shift the loan supply function. The results showed that large banks
can, to a certain extent, shield their loan portfolio from monetary policy changes. Similar
results hold for the more liquid (healthy) banks.
                                                          
14 The relevant results are available on request.
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Size indicators  
Number of institutions 60 43 12 5 14 5 30 3
Number of bank branches 2757 2562 31 164 24 1732 119 1249
Number of bank employees 57898 55112 244 2542 204 34751 2423 25789
Average total assets (millions of euros) 2198 2704 29,4 3052 19 16620,2 166,6 21321,3
Median total assets (millions of euros) 593,5 795 12 1852 17,5 12600 593,5 10045,5
Market share (percentage of total assets) 100 88,2 0,3 11,6 0,2 63,0 3,8 48,5
Asset structure (percentage of year-end total assets)
Cash 0,8 0,8 1,1 0,7 1,0 0,8 0,4 0,9
Loans to general government 2,6 2,2 0,3 6,0 0,5 3,1 0,7 3,7
Loans to non-MFI private sector 31,4 32,6 71,3 22,0 49,8 29,2 35,9 30,4
Loans to non-financial corporations 29,4 30,7 71,3 18,2 49,8 27,6 32,3 29,1
Loans to households 7,6 7,0 27,2 12,0 10,9 7,2 8,0 6,9
  of which:
    House purchase 5,3 4,4 6,1 11,9 2,2 5,8 4,2 5,8
Securities 23,8 21,3 2,5 42,8 0,0 29,0 7,7 25,0
  of which :
    Money market paper 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Other securities issued by MFIs 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 0,4
    Securities issued by general government 23,3 20,8 2,5 42,7 0,0 28,5 7,5 24,4
    Securities issued by non-financial corporations 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,1 0,3
  of which :
    Maturity of less than 2 years 3,1 3,3 0,0 1,1 0,0 3,8 1,1 4,1
    Maturity of more than 2 years 20,7 18,0 2,5 41,7 0,0 25,2 6,5 20,9
Shares and other equity 3,3 3,1 1,0 4,9 0,5 3,4 0,4 3,3
Assets denominated in foreign currencies 26,8 29,7 0,1 5,6 23,5 20,4 45,6 22,6
Assets denominated in non-euro area currencies 18,2 20,2 0,0 2,8 19,2 11,6 28,5 12,8
Liabilities structure (percentage of year-end total assets)
Overnight deposits 7,8 8,4 4,6 3,3 5,0 6,7 7,6 7,1
Time deposits
    Maturity of less than 2 years 62,4 63,3 59,2 55,7 37,9 71,2 38,5 70,5
    Maturity of more than 2 years 1,0 0,3 1,2 6,5 0,3 0,1 1,8 0,2
Debt securities 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,3 0,6 0,1 0,8
  of which :
    Money market paper 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Other 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,3 0,6 0,1 0,8
    Denominated in non-EMU currencies
Liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 32,5 35,7 0,5 8,4 17,3 25,7 47,7 29,8
Liabilities denominated in non-euro area currencies 23,5 25,8 0,0 6,6 13,5 16,1 34,3 18,8
Capital and reserves 8,3 6,6 29,5 20,2 29,1 6,7 7,7 5,5
Absolute                    
Small         Large  
Relative                   
Small         Large  













































Low High Low High Low High Low High
Size indicators
Number of institutions 66666666
Number of bank branches 52 18 18 908 6 21 22 144
Number of bank employees 1729 508 546 20469 241 185 1007 1580
Average total assets (millions of euros) 916,5 315,3 373,5 8562,8 245 54,5 654,5 1902,8
Median total assets (millions of euros) 360,5 3,5 46,5 2576 30 41 42 520
Market share (percentage of total assets) 4,2 1,4 1,7 39,0 1,1 0,2 3,0 8,6
Asset structure (percentage of year-end total assets)
Cash 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,1 1,1 2,7 0,0
Loans to general government 0,2 26,4 23,4 1,1 0,0 0,4 8,4 0,6
Loans to non-MFI private sector 27,3 41,3 40,4 23,5 4,8 73,8 49,0 8,6
Loans to non-financial corporations 24,4 37,6 36,4 22,1 4,8 73,8 44,7 6,2
Loans to households 8,9 0,9 2,2 8,4 2,3 30,5 30,4 5,0
  of which:
    House purchase 0,8 0,8 0,6 7,2 0,2 6,3 29,1 5,0
Securities 8,8 12,9 11,1 35,0 0,3 2,7 3,6 54,7
  of which :
    Money market paper 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Other securities issued by MFIs 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Securities issued by general government 8,2 12,1 10,4 34,2 0,3 2,7 3,6 54,7
    Securities issued by non-financial corporations 0,6 0,8 0,7 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
  of which :
    Maturity of less than 2 years 1,5 0,3 0,3 0,9 0,2 0,0 1,5 1,0
    Maturity of more than 2 years 7,3 12,6 10,8 34,1 0,1 2,7 2,1 53,7
Shares and other equity 0,2 9,0 7,6 2,8 0,0 1,1 9,2 1,2
Assets denominated in foreign currencies 59,5 32,0 35,1 22,5 83,8 0,0 14,5 9,1
Assets denominated in non-euro area currencies 56,3 19,3 22,9 13,3 64,0 0,0 9,9 7,7
Liabilities structure (percentage of year-end total assets)
Overnight deposits 5,8 0,0 0,6 6,7 6,2 3,8 13,1 0,4
Time deposits
    Maturity of less than 2 years 55,4 0,6 0,5 76,4 31,0 54,4 19,7 73,2
    Maturity of more than 2 years 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 3,6 1,3 25,3 0,0
Debt securities 0,0 0,2 0,2 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0
  of which :
    Money market paper 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Other 0,0 0,2 0,2 1,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0
    Denominated in non-EMU currencies
Liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 67,1 35,0 35,8 26,1 76,9 0,6 15,2 15,3
Liabilities denominated in non-euro area currencies 59,7 22,9 24,8 15,8 75,1 0,0 11,1 13,8
Capital and reserves 0,8 56,1 47,1 7,7 5,7 24,7 17,1 12,0
Liquidity
Table 1 (continued). Structure of the banking sector in Greece, December 1998 
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Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability Coefficient t-statistic Probability
∆Lt-1 -0,134 -3,20 0,0014 -0,130 -3,14 0,0018
∆Lt-2 -0,057 -1,38 0,1686 -0,047 -1,17 0,2426
∆Lt-3 0,159 3,89 0,0001 0,176 4,38 0,0000
∆Lt-12 -0,156 -4,26 0,0000 -0,148 -4,05 0,0001
∆rt-1+∆rt-2+∆rt-3 -0,034 -0,65 0,5129 -0,064 -1,24 0,2134
St-1 -0,031 -0,44 0,6612
Bt-1 -0,031 -0,63 0,5301
∆logYt-1+∆logYt-2+∆logYt-3 0,000 0,38 0,7039 0,000 0,29 0,7735
St-1*∆rt-1 1,706 0,44 0,6614
St-1*∆rt-2 -5,981 -1,40 0,1620
St-1*∆rt-3 -2,409 -0,62 0,5386
Bt-1*∆rt-1 23,546 0,81 0,4193
Bt-1*∆rt-2 42,320 1,30 0,1953
Bt-1*∆rt-3 97,221 3,37 0,0008
St-1*∆logYt-1 0,000 0,00 0,9967
St-1*∆logYt-2 -0,092 -1,28 0,2009
St-1*∆logYt-3 -0,031 -0,40 0,6901
Bt-1*∆logYt-1 0,000 0,47 0,6393
Bt-1*∆logYt-2 -0,022 -0,43 0,6674
Bt-1*∆logYt-3 -0,078 -1,44 0,1496
Dummy for 11/97 0,004 0,84 0,4002 0,026 2,69 0,0073
Sample Feb. 96 - Dec. 99 Feb. 96 - Dec. 99
Total panel observations 564 564
Adjusted R
2 0,129 0,140
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Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0,124 0,804 0,201 0,891 0,281
(0.47) (6.63) (0.77) (7.23) (1.08)
ρt-it 3,478 2,735 2,779 2,161 3,027
(2.65) (2.21) (2.15) (1.74) (2.37)
Dit 0,880 0,807 0,876 0,801 0,865
(34.35) (108.21) (34.95) (104.90) (34.49)
Sit*Dit -0,010 -0,010 -0,008
(-3.42) (-3.53) (-2.67)
Bit*Dit -0,051 -0,038 -0,032
(-6.37) (-4.21) (-3.51)
Sit*Bit*Dit 0,038 0,024 0,026
(5.83) (3.26) (3.55)
Short-run dynamics with fixed effects
ECTi,t-1 -0,021 -0,018 -0,019 -0,020 -0,018
(-2.75) (-2.17) (-2.56) (-2.38) (-2.23)
∆Li,t-1 -0,120 -0,124 -0,124 -0,132 -0,132
(-2.88) (-2.96) (-3.00) (-3.17) (-3.15)
∆Li,t-2 -0,061 -0,057 -0,062 -0,054 -0,059
(-1.47) (-1.39) (-1.52) (-1.31) (-1.43)
∆Li,t-3 0,158 0,159 0,152 0,151 0,147
(3.89) (4.53) (3.75) (3.73) (3.61)
∆Li,t-12 -0,163 -0,164 -0,154 -0,151 -0,149
(-4.51) (-4.53) (-4.24) (-4.17) (-4.11)
∆(ρt-1-it-1) 0,038 0,030 0,088 0,064 0,077
(0.25) (0.20) (0.58) (0.42) (0.50)
∆Di,t-1 -0,020 -0,012 -0,019 -0,010 -0,019
(-1.47) (-0.89) (-1.38) (-0.79) (-1.36)
∆(Si,t-1*Di,t-1) 0,003 0,003 0,003
(1.81) (2.29) (2.23)
∆(Bi,t-1*Di,t-1) -0,001 -0,003 -0,003
(-0.49) (-1.66) (-1.60)
∆(Si,t-1*Bi,t-1*Di,t-1) 0,003 0,004 0,004
(2.41) (2.63) (2.98)
Adjusted R
2 0,133 0,136 0,131 0,132 0,128
N 564 564 564 564 564
t statistic for co-integration test -7.07* -6.87* -7.11* -6.76* -7.03*
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t statistics.
          * indicates rejection of hypothesis of no co-integration at the 1% significance level.
Table 3. Loan supply function with distributional effects: panel estimation results
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